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This paper discusses the electricity reforms in California and in England
and Wales.  In both cases, a centralised spot market played a major role,
and both markets have now been abolished.  This paper argues that their
disappearance is not evidence that future electricity restructuring should
avoid the use of spot markets.  Instead, the problems in England and
Wales were largely due to market power.  In California, problems arising
from market power and a tightening demand-supply balance were turned
into a disaster because the spot market had not been backed up by hedging
contracts.
During the debate on how to deregulate the Californian electricity industry, one
participant distributed campaign buttons with the message “Stop Poolco.”  A vocal
group was convinced that the restructuring should not be based upon the model of a
                                                          
* I have gained from discussions about the Californian electricity markets with Carl Blumstein, Severin
Borenstein, and Jim Bushnell, but would not like to implicate them in what follows.
2single uniform-price auction market, combining electricity trading and its physical
dispatch, even though such a market was at the centre of the reforms in England and
Wales, arguably the catalyst for the Californian reforms.  When the new structure
took effect, in April 1998, the California Power Exchange was only one of a number
of schedule co-ordinators, reporting the results of its auction to the separate
Independent System Operator.  When the reform collapsed into chaos, the Power
Exchange was the most prominent early casualty.  It pre-deceased the Electricity Pool
of England and Wales by only two months, however, for on March 27, 2001, the
British government and regulator replaced the Pool with New Electricity Trading
Arrangements.  These were based on bilateral trading, with no place for the kind of
uniform-price auction at the centre of the previous system.
Were the campaign buttons right? Are centralised electricity auctions bound to
fail?  This paper analyses the causes of the problems in California, and in England and
Wales, to show that the auctions should not be blamed for most of them.  In England
and Wales, the Pool sometimes set inappropriate prices, and rule changes to improve
matters were sometimes blocked by its members, but the major problem was market
power.  In California, market power was again a problem, turned into a disaster by
regulation that required the utilities to sell at fixed prices, whatever the cost of buying
power.
What do we need (and want) in an electricity market?
When designing an electricity trading system, there are things we need, and things
that we should want.  The division between these may depend on the commentator,
but I believe that there are only two absolute needs.  First, the system must remain
stable, in an electrical sense - inflows must continuously match outflows, and
transmission constraints must be observed.  Second, all the power generated and
consumed must be paid for, avoiding free riding.
My list of “wants”, characteristics for a trading system that are desirable, but
not absolute requirements, is longer.  Most transactions should take place at stable
prices, to help participants plan their production and consumption.  The system's
dispatch should be as efficient as possible, minimising short-run costs.  Investment
decisions should also be efficient, to minimise long-run costs.  In a market system, the
best way to achieve efficiency is generally to have prices that signal costs.  In the
3absence of externalities, participants who maximise profits, taking these prices as
given, should create an efficient outcome.  Finally, it is best for the trading system to
be stable in the sense of avoiding frequent rule changes, since these can be costly to
implement, and create uncertainty for market participants, which can cost even more
in the long run.
Traditionally, power stations were subject to central dispatch, in order to
ensure the stability of the system.  The first proto-markets, regional power pools,
generally continued to operate in this way – the system operator in a “tight” power
pool could give orders to any station in that pool, as if it was part of the operator’s
own company.  It was natural for the first true electricity markets to follow this
pattern, as the industry was cautious about maintaining security of supply.  Under this
centralised model, all generators had to trade through the central market and follow its
dispatch instructions, based on the bids they submitted.  This was intended to
guarantee security, and, given cost-based bidding, should ensure an efficient dispatch.
All power flows were metered, and paid for at the prices set in the central market.
Where price hedging was desired, it could be provided through financial contracts for
differences, described below.
Once the markets based on “tight” pools were seen to be working, security of
supply became less of a constraint on market design, and policy-makers were more
willing to contemplate a greater degree of contractual freedom.  The second wave of
market designs allowed much more bilateral trading.  Under these models, generators
and retailers could trade bilaterally, decide which stations to schedule to perform the
trades, and merely inform the system operator of their choices.  Their trades would be
netted off from their generation and demand when calculating how much power they
were buying through the system operator.  Some central trading had to continue, for
some generators will inevitably produce more than they have sold (“spill” power)
while others will need “top-up” supplies; similarly, retailers will not succeed in
buying exactly the amount of power that their customers consume.  Some mechanism
had to cover these adjustments, and ensure that the power transferred through them
was paid for.  The system operator frequently ran this mechanism, for the adjustments
were linked to the need to keep the system stable, and that remained their
responsibility.  In an emergency, the system operator must be able to order generators
to change their output levels, paying appropriately if they do.  Bilateral trading could
offer participants stable prices (if they signed appropriate contracts), but efficient
4dispatch would depend on sufficient short-term trading to ensure that high-cost
stations that had sold their output in advance could be replaced by cheaper stations
that had not contracted their output for that period.
In the next sections, we see how the markets in England and Wales and in
California applied these different models – the Pool was a centralised “gross” market,
while California was built around the bilateral model. 
The Pool’s market design
The people who restructured the British electricity industry liked to think of
themselves as pioneers.  They may not have been aware that Chile had run an
electricity market for many years, or that the Norwegians were gradually expanding
the scope of their inter-company trading.  In any case, they believed that they were
proposing something radical when the White Paper outlining the restructuring was
published in 1988 (Department of Energy, 1988).  The restructuring proved more
complicated than most had imagined, and it was not until the autumn of 1989 that a
workable model for wholesale trading had been agreed.  Many in the industry had
been opposed to the decision to break the Central Electricity Generating Board into
competing generation companies and a transmission company (the National Grid
Company (NGC)), and were determined not to take risks with system stability.  
To this end, the Electricity Pool of England and Wales basically replicated the
CEGB’s procedures for scheduling generation.  In the past, a computer algorithm had
taken vectors of cost information and operating parameters for each generating set,
and calculated the least-cost schedule that would meet the demand forecast for the
following day.  The Pool used the same computer program, but the companies could
submit five price components in place of the vector of cost information.  An extra
program was written to average these price components and obtain the cost of power
from each station – the System Marginal Price (SMP) was based upon the bid of the
most expensive station in normal operation in each half-hour. 
A second component, the capacity payment, was based on the Loss of Load
Probability (the risk of a power cut) multiplied by the Value of Lost Load, set
administratively at £2/MWh, and up-rated annually for inflation.  This is a component
of the optimal electricity price (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1976) and should ensure that
stations that are only required at peak times can cover their fixed costs.
5SMP and the capacity payment were paid for all the generation in the day-
ahead schedule.  Actual generation would inevitably differ from this schedule, and
NGC’s controllers had to keep the system stable.  Stations would be instructed to vary
their output levels to meet changes in demand, and to react to plant failures.  There
would be transmission constraints, where the demand in part of the system, net of the
scheduled local generation, exceeded the amount of power that the network could
import.  Some stations in the area would have to be “constrained on”, generating more
than had been scheduled in order to relieve the constraint on the transmission lines,
while others, outside the area, would be “constrained off” to keep total generation in
line with demand.  All the stations producing more than had been scheduled would
have bid more then the ruling SMP (or they would have been scheduled), and so they
were paid their own bid price for the additional output.  All the stations producing less
than scheduled were required to buy back the unwanted power, but at their own bid
price, which was less than SMP (or they would not have been scheduled initially).
The difference between SMP and their bid was sometimes known as a “lost profit
payment”.  The costs of these payments, of capacity payments to stations that were
available but not scheduled to generate, and of buying reserve and other ancillary
services, were recovered in a price component known as Uplift.
To some extent, this approach might be portrayed as saying that the Pool dealt
with transmission pricing issues by ignoring them – all electricity was sold at the
same price.  The combination of constrained on and constrained off payments (also
known as counter-trading) ensures that generators are willing to follow the
dispatcher’s instructions.1  The prospect of high constrained-on payments gives
generators an incentive to locate in areas where transmission constraints create
shortages of power.  The lost-profit payments, however, mean that generators have no
incentive to avoid areas where the constraints create power surpluses.  Similarly, the
Pool ignored transmission losses when deciding which plant to schedule (although the
software could have taken them into account) – all stations were treated equally, and
suppliers’ metered demands increased pro-rata with the average losses across the
system.  This was despite the fact that 106 MW of power generated in the north of the
                                                          
1 Hogan (2001) reports the failure of the first version of the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
market, which allowed bilateral trading, and dealt with congestion by allowing the system operator to
constrain generators off, without giving them any lost profit payment.  All the generators at risk of
being constrained off quickly switched to bilateral trading, leaving the system operator in charge of
insufficient plant to manage congestion. 
6country would be needed to replace 94 MW generated in the south-west, due to the
marginal losses on north-south power flows.
Pool prices were expected to be volatile at times, but a hedging mechanism
was also designed.  Indeed, this hedging was central to the privatisation, in giving the
companies involved predictable cash flows for their first few years, and ensuring that
the British coal industry remained viable during the transition.  Contracts for
differences set payments between generators and suppliers, based on the level of the
Pool Purchase Price (SMP plus the Capacity Payment). Under a one-way CfD, the
generator would pay the supplier the difference between PPP and the strike price of
the contract, whenever PPP exceeded the strike price, in return for an up-front
payment.  A contract with a strike price equal to the marginal cost of the station, and
an up-front payment equal to its fixed costs (plus a profit margin), would effectively
mean that the contract’s buyer was buying the station’s output at a price close to cost.
The contract would be triggered whenever the Pool price was above the strike price,
which should be the times when the station is running, if it bids at marginal cost.  The
generator would therefore replace the uncertain stream of Pool prices with payments
equal to its costs, as long as it generates when required. 
Two-way CfDs require the buyer to pay the seller whenever the Pool Purchase
Price is less than the contract’s strike price.  They act as a straight hedge on the price,
and would normally be traded with a strike price equal to the expected Pool Purchase
Price (plus any margin for risk hedging) and no up-front premium.  At the time of
privatisation, however, a large number of three-year contracts were signed with prices
significantly above the expected Pool Purchase Price.  The excess allowed the two
major coal-fired generators, National Power and PowerGen, to pay above the world
market price for British coal, even though Pool prices were expected to relate to the
marginal cost of fuel, which was cheaper imported coal.  The contracts’ buyers, the
twelve Regional Electricity Companies, were allowed to pass the extra cost on to their
smaller consumers, who were not to get a choice of supplier until 1998.  Larger
consumers were allowed to shop around from the start, and did not have to pay a
premium for British coal – any contracts to support their purchases were based on the
expected Pool price. 
Appropriate CfDs can also be combined with the capacity payments
mechanism to promote efficient decisions about plant closures.  Many commentators
have suggested that capacity payments were intended to provide a signal for new
7investment, and then pointed out that it is inappropriate to base such decisions on a
price that changes every half-hour.  For at least twenty years, however, the level of
capacity in England and Wales has been “fine-tuned”, not by new investment, but by
bringing forward or delaying the closure of old stations.  CfDs exist which make
payments with reference to the capacity payment alone, and the strike price should be
based on the expected value of capacity payments over the year.  If there is a lot of
spare capacity, this expected value should be low, and less than the cost of keeping at
least some of this capacity open.  That can be seen as a market signal that closures
would be appropriate, remembering that the capacity payment is intended to reflect
the expected value of the energy that would be lost through capacity shortages.  When
there is less spare capacity, the expected capacity payment will be higher, raising the
value of the CfD, and signalling that stations should be kept open.  While the CfD can
“lock in” revenues for a station that is kept available throughout the year, the station is
still free to make day-to-day decisions about its availability on the basis of the
capacity payment expected for the following day.  It should be efficient to make the
station available whenever the expected capacity payment exceeds the cost of doing
so, but not when the expected capacity payment is lower.  This efficient course of
action should also be privately profitable, for the owner of a single station.
Experience with the Pool
The caveat at the end of the previous section is crucial for understanding the problems
that have been experienced in the UK electricity market.  The Pool mechanisms ought
to produce a reasonably efficient outcome, as long as there is no market power.  In the
presence of market power, any mechanism is likely to have problems, and the Pool
certainly did.  The government had intended to privatise the whole electricity
industry, including the nuclear stations that accounted for nearly 20% of output, but
had not performed well in the past – several had yet to be formally commissioned
after twenty years’ construction.  A large generating company, with 70% of the
industry’s capacity, was created in the hope that this could absorb the risks of the
nuclear stations’ future performance.  A second company, with the remaining 30% of
capacity, was a weak counter-balance to the first.  During 1989, it became evident that
the nuclear stations were felt to be too expensive and risky to be privatised, even in a
very large company, and they were withdrawn from the sale.  It was too late to alter
the rest of the structure, and so National Power, the larger of the two companies
8originally planned, inherited 60% of the industry’s conventional capacity, and
PowerGen inherited the other 40%.  It soon became evident that they had the ability
and incentive to raise prices well above competitive levels (Green and Newbery,
1992; Wolfram 1998, 1999).
At first, Pool Prices were very low: much lower than the government had
expected.  The generators’ contracts were at fixed prices, and so they did not worry
about the level of Pool prices.  They had an incentive to burn as much coal as
possible, and so bid low prices.  In April 1991, however, some of these contracts
expired, and the generators started to raise prices, as shown in figure 1.  Some large
customers had been persuaded to buy at Pool prices and were exposed to the increase.
Their complaints led to the regulator’s first enquiry into the major generators’
behaviour.  There have now been more than ten reports on competition in generation.  
The first reports concluded that Pool prices had been below the level of the
generators’ avoidable costs.  This meant that it was difficult to object to an increase,
although some specific bidding strategies were criticised.  The regulator also criticised
some features of the Pool Rules which led to price spikes.  This is when the price
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9might treble (or worse) for two or three half-hours.  It can be hard to determine the
cause of a particular spike, given the complexity of the scheduling program and the
bids.  Price-setting is a mechanistic process which occasionally seems to give absurd
results.  The prices have to stand, because contracts have been written around this
process.  
The Pool did modify some of its rules to prevent certain kinds of price spike.
However, it was generally difficult to change the Pool Rules, as a result of a
deliberate policy decision taken at the time of privatisation.  The government was
concerned that the industry might try to make life difficult for entrants, or that
generators might try to change the rules and disadvantage suppliers.  Voting in the
Pool was on the basis of market shares, with half the votes for generation and half for
supply, so that in the early days, when some generators had established supply
businesses, but suppliers had practically no generation, the generators had more than
half the votes.  To prevent this, the Pool Rules required super-majorities for change,
and gave members who disagreed with a given proposal several opportunities to delay
it, and then to appeal to the regulator.  The knowledge that he might have to take on a
quasi-judicial role inhibited the regulator from championing some desirable rule
changes.
The biggest failure was perhaps the issue of transmission losses.  When the
Pool was established, it was impossible to reach agreement on whether the charges for
losses should be differentiated on a geographical basis to reflect the marginal cost of
transmission, and the issue was put in a schedule of matters to be decided later.  In
due course, a scheme was proposed that would effectively have reduced the net
revenues of northern generators, and raised those of southern power stations, with
opposite effects on suppliers.  A coalition of companies who stood to lose from the
changes twice appealed decisions on the issue to the regulator, and finally asked for a
judicial review of the matter.  The case was tied up in the legal system until it was no
longer relevant, with new arrangements due to be introduced when the Pool was
abolished.
The Pool was more successful in dealing with the other transmission-related
charges, those recovered in Uplift.  Uplift rose rapidly after privatisation, in part
because NGC had to take a lot of transmission circuits out of commission in order to
connect new generators, thus creating temporary constraints.  NGC had no incentive
to minimise the cost of these, since they were passed straight through to consumers,
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whereas overtime working, for example, would add to NGC’s costs.  Following a
suggestion from the regulator, NGC and the rest of the industry negotiated an Uplift
Management Incentive Scheme.  If the out-turn level of Uplift was below its target,
NGC would receive a share of the savings, while if it was higher, NGC would absorb
a proportion of the excess costs.  Successor schemes became more sophisticated,
dividing Uplift into several portions, and giving NGC greater incentives to reduce the
parts that it was more able to influence, while some Uplift charges were later
transferred into a Transmission Services Use of System charge.  Table 1 shows that
the cost of Uplift generally fell from the mid-1990s onward.2
Table 1: Uplift costs (£ million)
Constraint costs Total Uplift
1990/1 50 267
1991/2 145 475
1992/3 136 383
1993/4 255 592
1994/5 194 718
1995/6 73 655
1996/7 58 595
1997/8 25 412
1998/9 21 370
1999/2000 15 476
  
While the progress in keeping Uplift under control has been helpful, it is only
one component of the Pool Selling Price.  The overall level of prices is of most
concern to suppliers and customers.  In his first reports, the regulator did not object to
the level of prices, but in 1993 he decided that recent price increases had been
unjustified.  He threatened to refer the companies to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission, which could have broken them up.  To avoid this, they promised to keep
prices down for the next two years, and to sell about 15% of their plant.  They did
this, and the real time-weighted Pool Selling Price fell in every year after 1993/94,
                                                          
2 Uplift includes the cost of Capacity Payments to stations that are available but not scheduled to
generate, and so the relatively high capacity payments of 1991/2, 1994-7, and 1999/2000 will be
reflected in the Uplift figures for those years.
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with one exception, when the lower capacity payments of 1997/98 were more than
offset by an increase in SMP.  The major generators raised their bids to maintain their
revenues, and were criticised for this by the regulator.  The market was becoming
more competitive, however, with entry on a large scale, and further divestitures by
National Power and PowerGen.  Figure 2 shows this gradual fragmentation.
Despite this, in October 1999, the regulator asked the eight largest generators
to accept a “good behaviour” condition in their licences.  It would have allowed him
to intervene if he had believed that they were acting in an anti-competitive manner.
Two companies, British Energy and AES, rejected the condition, and the matter was
referred to the Competition Commission.  The Commission decided that the condition
was not required, and the regulator withdrew it from the licences of the companies
that had accepted it. One major factor in the decision was that the Pool was about to
be abolished, and concerns about the generators’ ability to manipulate the Pool’s
pricing mechanism would only apply for a few more months.
Generation in England and Wales
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
89/90 90/1 91/2 92/3 93/4 94/5 95/6 96/7 97/8 98/9 99/00 00/01 01/02
(est)
TWh
PSB /
Mission
PG
    Mis'n
  Eastern
    AES
NP
IPP
Import
NE
  Magnox
Figure 2
12
The New Electricity Trading Arrangements
The regulator had long been growing impatient with the Pool’s inability to change its
rules and reform its procedures.  In May 1997, a Labour government was elected,
with historical ties to the UK’s dwindling number of coal miners.  Since privatisation,
the demand for coal had nearly halved, as coal-fired stations were replaced by
Combined Cycle Gas Turbines.  There were accusations that this had only happened
because the nature of competition in the Pool was unfair, due to its uniform-price rule.
Gas-fired stations could submit a bid of zero, but still receive the Pool Purchase Price,
set by coal-fired stations that had to submit higher bids, and therefore lost market
share.3  The fact that all stations received the price set by the marginal bidder was also
believed to make the Pool more vulnerable to the exercise of market power.  In
October 1997, the government announced a review of the Pool.  The following year,
an Energy White Paper announced that the Pool would be replaced with New
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), which started, after some delay, in March
2001. 
NETA has replaced the Pool's centralised market with as much freedom to
contract as possible.  There is no central market until shortly hours before real time,
and most electricity is being traded via bilateral contracts.  Several companies have
set up power exchanges to facilitate trading in the last day or so before real time
operation, left entirely to their own devices by the government and the regulator.  In
the last few hours before real time operation,4 NGC runs a balancing mechanism,
keeping the system stable by accepting bids and offers to raise or reduce generation
and consumption.  Each accepted trade is paid its own bid or offer.
Traders have to notify Elexon (formerly described as the Balancing and
Settlement Company) of their electricity contracts, which are compared with their
metered demand or output.  Companies with imbalances between their contracted
positions and their metered quantities have to cash them out at unattractive prices.
Companies needing to buy power (generators who have under-generated, and
suppliers with consumers who have bought more than the supplier contracted for)
have to pay the System Buy Price (SBP), the average of the prices that NGC paid to
buy power in the Balancing Mechanism.  Companies needing to sell power get the
                                                          
3 In other words, the incumbents kept prices high, encouraging entry, and therefore losing market share.
4 At first, bilateral trading had to stop 3½ hours before real time, but this “gate closure” was moved to
one hour before real time on 3July 2002.
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System Sell Price (SSP), the average of the prices that NGC received for selling
power in the Balancing Mechanism.  The intention was to give companies a strong
incentive to contract accurately in advance, for the SBP was expected to be greater
than the cost of power bought in advance, while the SSP was expected to be lower.  
In the first year of NETA’s operation, the mean SBP was £38.66/MWh, while
the mean SSP was £9.20/MWh.  The mean of the UKPX’s reference price data (which
assesses day-ahead and on-the-day trades) was £16.46/MWh, while the Ofgem index
used to settle imbalances in Scotland, based on bilateral trading figures from price
reporters, averaged £17.97/MWh.  The level and volatility of the SBP meant that most
traders were more anxious to avoid the SBP than the SSP, and accordingly tried to
have a surplus of energy at gate closure, rather than to balance their positions.  The
cost of cashing out these real-time imbalances has to be added to the price of power
bought in advance to obtain the overall cost of power under NETA.5  Many generators
have chosen to self-insure against the risk of plant failure by part-loading their
stations, so that they can increase output from their other stations if one has a
problem.6  The average amount of reserve has doubled from 1-2 GW under the Pool
to around 4 GW under NETA, even though part-loading plant in this way reduces its
thermal efficiency. 
Small generators did badly in the early days of NETA, facing lower prices and
falling output levels.  Some reported difficulty in securing a contract to sell their
power, since buyers were reluctant to absorb their potentially unpredictable output.
Bathurst and Strbac, (2001) showed that wind generators would have lost money by
generating in the first few days of NETA, given the initial volatility of imbalance
prices.  The government and the regulator have attempted to promote consolidation
services, in which one company combines the output of several generators, which will
be less volatile than the individual stations’ outputs, though very few generators have
so far signed contracts with them.  Changes to the overall regime for supporting
renewable generators, lower gas prices, and the reduction of imbalance price volatility
mean that most small generators are now faring relatively better (Ofgem, 2002).
                                                          
5 Figure 1 includes an estimate of these costs.  The bar for 2001/2 uses the day-ahead RPD figures,
which are closer in spirit to Pool prices than the (higher) Ofgem index quoted above, based on longer-
term trades.
6 It is not clear whether generators use the spare capacity to replace lost output at once, which implies
that they would no longer be following the final physical notifications submitted to NGC, potentially
making it harder to keep the system in balance. 
14
 For consumers, however, the overall price of power will be a more important
measure of NETA’s success or failure.  The regulator has complained that Pool prices
were as high at the end of the 1990s as at the start of the decade, despite significant
reductions in generating costs.  Figure 1 shows that this is true, and that it is
misleading.  The effective price for most electricity trades are set by contracts, and
average contract prices were well above Pool prices in 1990/1.  Over the next few
years, however, the differential between contract prices and Pool prices fell.7  This
means that the effective price of electricity has declined significantly over the decade,
even though it may still be above the level of a new entrant’s costs.  
The government and the regulator argued that moving from uniform pricing to
bilateral trading would reduce the scope for generators to exercise their market power.
Studies in auction markets for government securities (quoted by Newbery, 1999)
imply that moving from uniform pricing to a discriminatory auction will make prices
more competitive for a given number of traders, but may discourage entry, reducing
the number of traders, which could make prices less competitive overall.  Bower and
Bunn (2000) used a simulation model to predict that moving from the Pool to a
discriminatory pricing auction would increase prices.  The regulator and the
government have pointed to the reduction in Pool prices at the end of the 1990s as
evidence that the market was anticipating NETA.  
It is hard to see how an expected reduction in the future price of a commodity
can affect its current price, when the commodity in question is non-storable.  The
normal arbitrage conditions via storage fail to apply.  That means that the price
reductions preceding NETA are likely to have more to do with a reduction in market
power, as National Power and PowerGen sold a number of their stations to other
companies, than the future change in market rules.  The companies’ incentive to use
their market power may also have been reduced by a fear that the new regulator
would become less tolerant in the run-up to NETA.  
In any case, figure 1 shows that the System Marginal Price in 2000/1 was
close to the level of prices under NETA.  The Pool Purchase Price was significantly
higher, because of capacity payments, which peaked in the early autumn of 2000. 
                                                          
7 The line in the figure takes actual revenues per kWh generated for National Power, PowerGen and
Nuclear Electric, and assumes all other sales were made at the Pool Purchase Price.  From 1992/3
onwards, entrants linked to the RECs generated an increasing proportion of electricity.  Their contract
prices were well above Pool prices, and calculations based on the major generators’ selling prices
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The balance between supply and demand was not particularly tight at that time, but a
complex interaction between the mix of plant on the system (a relatively high
proportion was new) and the way in which capacity payments were calculated
produced very high prices.  Pool prices during 2000/1 can therefore either be taken as
a sign that, yet again, the Pool’s complexity kept prices too high, or as a suggestion
that competition had finally brought SMP down, and if better governance had allowed
a quick reaction to the problems with capacity payments, the overall level of Pool
prices could have been close to the levels under NETA in the following year.
To find the true impact of NETA, we must await a study of pricing behaviour,
linked to market structure, once the market has been operating for a reasonable
period.8  At present, we can only say that although the Pool’s governance structure
proved inadequate, it might have been reformed for a lot less than the £500 million
that NETA has cost to implement.  NETA needs effective arbitrage between a number
of separate markets if it is to produce an efficient dispatch.  California chose a market
design with several markets, and it is to that design that we now turn.
 
California’s Market Design
California started to deregulate its electricity industry in the mid-1990s.  The
California Public Utilities Commission created an outline plan known as the Blue
book in 1994, but the restructuring was the formal creation of the State Legislature, in
the form of Assembly Bill 1890, passed unanimously in 1996.
The open nature of American law-making ensured that a vigorous debate
preceded AB1890.  As already mentioned, the vociferous lobby which opposed the
idea of a compulsory centralised market won the argument.  Some people were
arguing from conviction, in the belief that a monopoly market-maker was likely to be
inflexible and inefficient, compared to organisations forced to compete for customers.
Stoft (1997), however, points out that some participants in the debate could have had
other motives.  Energy traders, or power marketers, make most of their profits from
exploiting arbitrage opportunities – selling something for more than it cost to buy.  In
markets where arbitrageurs are successful, this normally implies that they are
performing a useful service, often bearing risk, and ensuring that prices converge to
                                                                                                                                                                     
would have given an underestimate of average prices from the mid-90s onwards.  The two points for
later in the decade are based on yardsticks for the RECs’ purchase costs.
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efficient levels.  Stoft’s argument, however, is that some participants in the California
debate had an incentive to deliberately design an inefficient market, maximising the
arbitrage opportunities that they could profit from.
Arbitrage depends on the same product being traded in more than one market,
and the Californian reform certainly achieved this pre-condition.  An independent
system operator was established to control the network, running a real-time market to
keep generation and demand in balance.  The ISO also ran five markets for different
kinds of reserve, ranging from regulation reserve (part-loaded plant able to respond
instantly to a shortage of power) to half-hour reserve.
While the ISO was responsible for keeping the system stable, it was not
responsible for scheduling plant.  Any scheduling co-ordinator (SC) could submit a
balanced schedule, of matched generation and demand, to the ISO.  The SC could
include ‘incs’ and ‘decs’, prices for which the generators it controlled would be
willing to increase or decrease output.  The ISO then had to assess whether the
schedules were feasible, or whether they would create congestion on the lines (“Path
15”) linking the north and the south of the state.  If the initial schedules were
infeasible, the ISO would use the information in the inc and dec bids to find a feasible
alternative dispatch, and would suggest this to the scheduling co-ordinators.  Only
after the scheduling co-ordinators had returned to the ISO with their revised schedules
could the ISO take over the problem of congestion management, buying and selling
itself to ensure a feasible dispatch.  If path 15 was congested, the state would be split
into two zones, and the ISO’s real time market would produce a different price for
each. 
Scheduling co-ordinators who sent power across the constrained boundary
would have to pay (or receive) the difference between the two zonal prices as a
transmission charge.  The ISO also had to resolve intra-zonal congestion, which it
handled in the same way as the English system, buying from and selling back to
appropriately located stations, and spreading the cost across all consumers.  The ISO
attempted to hedge the cost of some constraints by signing “reliability must run”
contracts with strategically located plant.
The largest scheduling co-ordinator was the California Power Exchange, set
up by the state as a not-for-profit organisation.  The PX ran a day-ahead auction in
                                                                                                                                                                     
8 Bower (2002) reports an initial analysis which suggests that competition had a much greater effect on
prices than NETA.
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which generators and retailers submitted supply and demand schedules for each hour,
and the PX found the hourly market-clearing price and quantity at the intersection of
the schedules.  The PX had devised an elaborate set of rules for adjusting bids if the
auction did not at first produce an equilibrium, designed to ensure rapid convergence
to an efficient price, but it turned out that these were not required and the PX
continued as a single-iteration auction.  The PX later added “day of” auctions to allow
participants to adjust their positions after the first auction had closed, but before the
ISO’s real-time market opened.
The three large investor-owned utilities in California, Pacific Gas and Electric,
San Diego Gas and Electric, and Southern California Edison, were required to buy all
of their requirements from the PX, and to schedule their generation through it.9  They
were also required to divest at least half of their fossil-fuelled generating capacity, to
reduce the potential for market power.  In return for this, the reform included a
Competitive Transition Charge (CTC), designed to enable the companies to recover
their stranded costs – the difference between the market value of their generation
assets after deregulation, and the amount that the former system of regulation would
have allowed the companies to earn for them.
The level of the CTC in any hour was not set in advance, although each
company was given a maximum amount that it could recover before December 31,
2001, when the CTC would expire.  AB1890 had included a 10% rate reduction for
residential customers, to take effect at liberalisation, followed by a four-year rate
freeze.  In each hour, the CTC for each utility was the difference between its frozen
rate and the sum of its purchase costs and its (still regulated) charge for transmission
and distribution.  This provided the utility with an apparently perfect hedge in the
short term, since the three cost components (transmission and distribution, electricity
purchase, and CTC) would exactly equal its revenue.  If the wholesale price was less
than expected, the CTC would be increased, and the company’s stranded costs would
be paid off more quickly.  The total amount to be recovered would not change,
however, leaving the company insulated from the impact of the wholesale price.
Once each utility had recovered all of its stranded costs, the price it was allowed to
charge would equal the wholesale price, plus its charge for transmission and
                                                          
9 In practice, of course, the utilities had to do some of their trading in the ISO’s real-time market.
18
distribution.  As before, the utility would be hedged against fluctuations in the
wholesale price, which would be passed on to consumers. 
The first exception to this apparently perfect hedge was that it did not fully
protect the utilities against high wholesale prices.  As long as the CTC was going to
be fully paid off before December 2001, the utilities’ revenues would be equal to their
transmission and distribution charges, plus the wholesale price, plus their stranded
costs – in other words, equal to their costs.  If wholesale prices became too high,
however, the CTC in each period would be lower, and it might not be possible to pay
off all the stranded costs before December 2001.  In that case, the utilities’ revenues
over the first four years would be fixed by the rate freeze, but their costs would
depend upon the level of the wholesale price, leaving them potentially vulnerable to
increases. 
The second exception would occur if it turned out not to be possible to pass on
increases in the wholesale price to customers, even after the CTC had expired.  Most
discussions of retail competition in the US have been based on the idea that the
incumbent utility would offer some kind of “default service”, passing through the spot
cost of buying electricity, and that customers who wanted the added value of a
hedging contract would have to obtain it from a new entrant.  In some states,
customers who switched away from the incumbent utility were given a generous
“shopping credit”, well above the expected wholesale price, which allowed
competitive retailers to cover the costs of buying power, make a profit, and still
undercut the incumbent.  Retail competition was relatively “successful” in these
states, in that a significant number of consumers chose to buy the cheaper power.10
The competing retailers had the option of making arrangements to hedge their power
purchase costs in order to offer fixed prices.  
In California, however, the shopping credit was set equal to the wholesale
price, leaving no margin for a retailer to cover its own costs.  Very few customers
switched, and most of those did so in order to buy “green power” from renewable
generators.  The incumbent utilities were allowed to hedge some of their spot
purchases in the PX’s “block forwards” market, but only one of the three did so on a
significant scale.  This meant that in California, practically all customers would be
                                                          
10 The UK adopted an equivalent system, in that the incumbents’ charges were split into generation,
transmission, distribution and supply, and entrants only had to pay the incumbents for transmission and
distribution, leaving a margin to cover their own supply costs.
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exposed to changes in the PX price, once the CTC had expired.  Should PX prices
ever be seen as excessive, this could lead to political problems.
California’s Experience
At first, the Californian electricity markets appeared to have got off to a good start.
Some problems appeared in the ISO’s reserve markets, where one of the market rules
required the ISO to buy fixed quantities of each kind of reserve, whatever the price,
even if a higher quality reserve (i.e., one available at shorter notice) was available at a
lower price.  The ISO was allowed to remove the restrictions, and things improved.
At first, most companies bidding into the ISO’s markets were required to base
their bids on their costs, but the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission gradually
gave an increasing number of participants the authority to set “market-based rates”.
Because of the fear of market power, there was a bid cap of $250/MWh in the ISO’s
real-time market.  This bid cap naturally affected the shape of the demand curves in
the PX’s day-ahead market – no buyer would wish to pay more than $250 in the PX,
when they knew the price in the real-time market would be capped at this level.  More
generally, we should expect prices in the real-time market and the PX to track each
other closely, in that the PX price should be an unbiased predictor of the real-time
price, in the absence of risk-aversion and transaction costs (Borenstein et al, 2000).
Borenstein et al found that there were significant differences between the two prices
during 1998, but that the prices converged during the first half of 1999.  They took
this to imply that market participants were learning over time, and that the interactions
between the markets were gradually becoming more efficient, although some
inefficiencies persisted.  They are careful to point out that this is not a test for the
efficiency of the individual markets.  Nevertheless, their evidence does not support
the argument that a centralised pool is essential because separating electricity trading
across several markets will inevitably be inefficient.
The specific inefficiency that Borenstein et al mention is market power.
Puller (2001), for example, found direct evidence of market power during peak hours
in 1998 and 1999 – companies had unused capacity with marginal costs below the
market price.  On average, however, the ISO’s Department of Market Analysis found
that prices were below a competitive benchmark (based on marginal cost bidding) in
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many months during the first two years of the market’s operation (figure 3).11  Prices
were 20% above the benchmark during the summer of 1998, however, and also rose
above the benchmark level in the summer and autumn of 1999.
This was a warning sign – demand had been growing rapidly in California,
and there had been little new investment for a decade.  Some commentators blame
tight environmental restrictions; others point out that no plant has actually been
refused on environmental grounds, although some potential investors may just have
seen no point in making an application they felt sure would be refused.  In the middle
of the decade, uncertainty over new market rules is likely to have discouraged
investment.  The supply-demand balance in adjoining states had also been tightening.
California had traditionally imported more than one-sixth of its requirements, but
when 2000 turned out to be a dry year, the level of imports halved. 
In May 2000, as demand rose for the summer, the competitive baseline cost
rose.  Prices rose by more, however, as the narrowing gap between demand and
supply increased the scope for the exercise of market power.  The problem became far
worse in June, when the reserve margin fell below 10% of demand in a significant
number of hours.  The mark-ups achieved in those hours have been added to the
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competitive benchmark prices in the figure, since a competitive market would require
a “rationing price” when demand comes close to exceeding supply.  Prices were even
higher in August, and then fell slightly at the start of the autumn.
Note that the competitive price was more than double the level of the previous
year.  Part of this was due to the narrowing gap between demand and capacity, part
was due to an increase in the price of gas.  Natural gas spot prices at the Henry Hub in
Louisiana rose by 50% between the spring and autumn of 2000.  The price in
California was almost identical to the Henry Hub price in April 2000, but 20% higher
for a few weeks at the end of the summer.  This differential, linked to a shortage of
capacity on the pipeline into California, reappeared in November and worsened – at
one point in early December, the Californian price exceeded $50/MMBTU, while the
Henry Hub price was below $10/MMBTU.  The capacity shortage may well have
been affected by market power in the gas market – its consequences in the electricity
market were disastrous. 
Both the “competitive benchmark” (based on the California spot gas price)
and the actual average market price went “off the graph” in December 2000 – the ISO
calculated the average price paid as $395/MWh, compared to a competitive
benchmark of $285/MWh.  The utilities could not cope with prices at this level.  They
were buying most of their power on the spot market, but selling it at prices fixed
under the rate freeze.  In San Diego, prices had been unfrozen, but the California
Public Utilities Commission capped prices again in response to consumer protests.
The utilities had received authority to hedge some of their purchases, but had taken
little advantage of this, apparently because the prices available at the time had seemed
excessive (Faruqui et al, 2001).  The utilities stopped paying for power, and there are
stories that this left some generators unable to buy fuel, and forcing them off-line.
Other generators seem to have stopped supplying because they feared they would not
be paid in future.  Supplies from outside the state fell for a similar reason, and because
low rainfall had reduced the amount of hydro-electric energy available.  Demand
exceeded the available supply (although the winter is not the peak season for demand
in California), and the ISO had to commence a programme of rolling blackouts at
peak times of day.
                                                                                                                                                                     
11 Hildebrandt’s figures for July – August 1998 seem inconsistent with his price graph for the same
period, and so my figure has been drawn to match a graph by Sheffrin (2001), using a (possibly
updated version of) the same analysis. 
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The ISO had to resort to physical rationing, because the mechanisms for
rationing by price were missing.  Most consumers were still paying capped retail
rates.  Relatively few customers had time-of-use metering, that would allow their
suppliers to charge prices that varied within the day.  Some of those customers were
on time-of-day pricing schemes, paying more at peak times, but those schemes were
not linked to actual wholesale market prices.  By contrast, 50% of energy
consumption in England and Wales goes through meters that record consumption by
the half-hour, and a significant proportion of these consumers were on “pool-related”
tariffs.  Those tariffs passed through the actual spot price of power, giving consumers
real incentives to reduce demand when prices are high.12
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission imposed a “soft cap” on prices in
the PX.  Any generator bidding more than $250/MWh had to be prepared to justify its
bid, and while those generators would receive their own bid, the market clearing price
for generators bidding less would be capped at $250/MWh.  The PX was unable to re-
design its software to implement the new rules, and declared itself bankrupt, unable to
run its market, in January 2001.  Such caps were not always effective in keeping
prices down, in any case – some generators reduced the amount of power they were
selling through the formal markets, forcing the ISO to buy emergency supplies at
uncapped prices.  The California Department of Water Resources started to buy
electricity on behalf of the utilities through bilateral contracts, paying fearfully high
prices.
With further outages seemingly inevitable, a large-scale conservation effort
was put in place.  This succeeded in reducing California’s energy usage by 6% (and
peak demand by 8%) in the summer of 2001, compared to the previous year
(Goldman et al, 2002).  Gas prices fell, reflecting lower demand and structural
improvements in the gas market.  FERC issued market power mitigation orders
capping generators’ bids in relation to their costs, first in California and then across
the entire Western region.  An 1100 MW nuclear unit came back on line after a five-
month repair in June, and 1400 MW of new capacity was added by the end of the
summer.  The ISO’s real-time price, which had averaged $70/MWh in April and May,
                                                          
12 The Pool did not have an adequate mechanism to ensure that these demand reductions fed back to the
equilibrium price, although there was a rudimentary scheme for “demand side bidding” in the daily
auction, which sometimes held prices down at peak times.
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fell to $56/MWh in June, $41/MWh in July, and around $30/MWh for the rest of
2001.  No more compulsory outages occurred.
What went wrong?
California’s reform was derailed by an unexpected rise in gas prices and the
predictable narrowing of the gap between capacity and demand, which gave (also
predictable) opportunities for generators to exploit their market power.  Once the
system had begun to break down, the complexity of the markets’ organisation made
things worse, since many generators were able to switch between markets to obtain
the best prices in the face of different regulatory limits.  The markets’ complexity was
not the primary cause of the disaster, however.  Nor was the dominance of the PX’s
uniform price auction, despite the arguments used against the Pool in England and
Wales – the State paid extremely high prices for its bilateral purchases.
The key problem was not the dominance of a uniform price auction, but the
dominance of a spot market with little hedging.  The apparent hedge provided by the
CTC reduced the risk that was taken here, but it did not eliminate it.  The disaster
could probably have been averted if the utilities had signed appropriate hedging
contracts.  Assuming that the PX would have continued as the main spot market, these
would have needed to be contracts for differences, as in England and Wales.
Alternatively, physical bilateral contracts could have been combined with a spot
market for the remaining trades.  These contracts could have insulated the utilities
from most of the impact of the rising spot prices.  Furthermore, contracts reduce
generators’ incentives to abuse their market power (Green, 1999; Newbery, 1998),
helping to keep spot prices down.  If the generators had hedged their output prices but
not their fuel costs, of course, the utilities’ problems would simply have been
transferred upstream when gas prices rose.  In the UK, however, the generators who
hedged their output prices also hedged most of their fuel purchases. Several electricity
contracts indexed the electricity price to the fuel price, while at least one plant had a
fuel contract indexed to the electricity price, implying that its gas supplier was taking
some of the risk.
Such a package of contracts would have insulated most of the market from the
gas price rises in the short term.  Since CfDs are for fixed volumes, however, the price
signals would remain relevant at the margin, giving incentives for conservation, could
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they be passed on to consumers.  Would the long-term impact have been any
different, however, or would contracts merely have postponed the reckoning?
To the extent that spot prices are high because of a fundamental mis-match
between demand and capacity, and an increase in the competitive price of gas,
contracts would (and should) only slow the adjustment of average prices to the level
in spot trades.  To the extent that prices rose because capacity was withdrawn because
of the fear of default, contracts would have produced lower prices, if they had ensured
that the utilities could pay their bills.  Contracts can also have an enduring impact on
market power.  While many discussions of contracts as a market power mitigation
tool focus on vesting contracts imposed on generators at the time of restructuring, the
experience in the UK shows that generators voluntarily sold additional, annual,
contracts to hedge most of their sales, even though this reduced their spot market
power.  While the British generators’ incentive to abuse their market power was
probably reduced by an effective regulator, those who argue that only involuntary
contracting can have an impact on market power are probably overly pessimistic.
Similarly, long-term contracts in the gas market might have reduced the differential
between California prices and those at the Henry Hub. 
Conclusions
California’s electricity reform has been a disaster that will affect the future path of
electricity restructuring.  The aspect of the reform that made the disaster possible was
not the fact that most power was traded through the PX’s auction, but the fact that so
few of the trades were hedged.  Contracts for differences allow generators and
retailers to hedge their price risks, while still using a central spot market to obtain an
efficient dispatch.  This model can also accommodate a high proportion of physical
bilateral trading, as long as enough generators are willing to adjust their plans in the
light of signals (and payments) from the central spot market.  A market that decided
that California’s problems stemmed from the use of a central auction, and decided to
rely entirely on bilateral trading, would be learning the wrong lessons from the
disaster.  
FERC has recently (July 2002) issued its proposal for a Standard Market
Design that should be imposed throughout the United States.  “Central to the Standard
Market Design concept is its reliance on bilateral contracts entered into between
buyers and sellers” (FERC, 2002, para 10). The Commission goes on to say, however,
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that “we believe that congestion management, balancing of load and generation in real
time, and the provision of ancillary services can be accomplished most reliably and
efficiently by a bid-based, security-constrained spot market” (para 137).  The spot
market would produce price signals of the real-time state of the system, and give
participants the incentive and the means to adjust the positions reached via bilateral
contracts.
In England and Wales, the Pool that inspired so many restructuring efforts
around the world has been abolished.  As a pioneer, it had a design that others
improved on elsewhere.  If its governance had been better, it might have been able to
incorporate some of those improvements itself.  Instead, it was unable to evolve, and
generators with market power were able to abuse its rules.  Those generators could
well have been able to raise prices, given any set of market rules, such was their
dominance of the industry.  That dominance declined over time, however, and after
ten years, the industry was probably workably competitive.  Prices declined as
competition grew.  Prices under NETA have been lower than they were under the
Pool.  It would be a mistake to link this to the abolition of the Pool, rather than the
growth in competition. 
The true lessons from California, and from England and Wales, are that
centralised spot markets can work, but that they need to be combined with suitable
price hedges, and regulators must be vigilant, and take action, against market power.
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